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CAN NEUROSCIENCE HELP PREDICT
FUTURE ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOR?
Lyn M. Gaudet,* Jason P. Kerkmans,** Nathaniel E. Anderson***
& Kent A. Kiehl****
INTRODUCTION
Our society is founded on a collection of rules regarding acceptable and
unacceptable behavior. These rules are shaped by beliefs and values and
are subject to revision through the democratic legislative process. For the
most part, the rules are well known and widely followed. Society functions
on the premise that its members are aware of and will follow the rules. Our
criminal justice system, in turn, is designed to determine if a violation of
society’s rules occurred and whether that violation warrants a sanction. If
so, the justice system assesses the level of responsibility, culpability, and
punishment appropriate for individual offenders.
Given these
responsibilities, the criminal justice system has to make decisions regarding
individuals. These decisions often involve prediction. Indeed, most
decisions in the criminal justice system involve some form of prediction.
Consider, for example, the following decisions: choosing whether or not to
grant bail, probation, or parole to an individual; establishing whether an
individual is eligible for treatment; and determining his or her appropriate
sentence. Each of these processes involves some type of evaluation of an
individual in order to make a decision—ideally an informed, objective, and
reliable decision—about what he or she is likely to do or to not do in the
future.
A key concern for the criminal justice system is an individual’s
likelihood of displaying future antisocial behavior, or behavior that involves
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and a current Research Fellow for and former Research Director of the Center for Law
Science and Innovation at Arizona State University Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law.
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Article is part of a symposium entitled Criminal Behavior and the Brain: When Law and
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a disregard for the rules and the well-being of others. The traditional
assessments used to evaluate offenders for future risk of antisocial or
violent behavior include self-reporting measures, various types of
interviews, and expert-administered test batteries. These tools seek to
assess possible intellectual and cognitive impairment and to measure
psychological and neuropsychological constructs, including personality
states and traits. But, given that the brain has the most proximal influence
on behavior, direct measures of brain structure and function may be better
than proxy measures in predicting future antisocial behavior. The question
then becomes: If we can get information from neuroscience techniques,
does that information add predictive utility to understanding and assessing
antisocial behavior? To date, studies suggest that it does.
Part I of this Article reviews the tools currently available to predict
antisocial behavior. Part II discusses legal precedent regarding the use of,
and challenges to, various prediction methods. Part III introduces recent
neuroscience work in this area and reviews two studies that have
successfully used neuroimaging techniques to predict recidivism. Part IV
discusses some criticisms that are commonly levied against the various
prediction methods and highlights the disparity between the attitudes of the
scientific and legal communities toward risk assessment generally and
neuroscience specifically. Lastly, Part V explains why neuroscience
methods will likely continue to help inform and, ideally, improve the tools
we use to help assess, understand, and predict human behavior.
I. PREDICTION TOOLS FOR FUTURE ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOR
The goal of any type of forensic assessment is to help legal decision
makers make more informed predictions about individuals within the
criminal justice system. There are many different methods and techniques
used to predict future antisocial behavior. Many of these methods are
aimed at predicting future violent behavior specifically, which may also be
described as future dangerousness. Specific approaches are reviewed later
in this Article, but regardless of the approach, there are certain factors, or
variables, that have been associated with violence. These factors can be
organized into four categories: dispositional, historical, clinical, and
contextual.1 Dispositional, or demographic, factors include age, gender,
race, socioeconomic status, cognitive functioning, and neurological status.2
Historical variables include all significant events from an individual’s past,
such as criminal history, substance abuse history, and employment.3
Clinical factors include psychiatric and personality disorders and
symptoms.4 Lastly, contextual factors refer to the environment and to
1. See generally Kevin S. Douglas & Christopher D. Webster, Predicting Violence in
Mentally and Personality Disordered Individuals, in PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW: THE STATE OF
THE DISCIPLINE 175 (Ronald Roesch et al. eds., 1999).
2. See D.A. Louw et al., Prediction of Violent Behaviour: Professionals’ Appraisal, 5
CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 379, 380 (2005).
3. See id. at 382.
4. See id. at 384.
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aspects of the person-environment interaction, including access to drugs,
weapons, or victims, the level of supervision and support, and stress
factors.5 The weight or importance attached to the various factors depends
on the model and technique being used and the specific outcome being
predicted.
One important caveat relating to the factors that are helpful in predicting
future violence is that the relationship between the risk factor and violence
may be nuanced and not a direct causal relationship. In addition, there may
be disparate findings in the literature, making it difficult to discern whether
a construct or condition is truly predictive. For example, research published
in the 1990s found a positive association between violence and some types
of mental illness, particularly psychosis and schizophrenia.6 Subsequent
studies found psychotic disorders to be negatively related to violence risk.7
The mixed findings were largely due to differences in methodology and
study quality.8 Recent data suggest that individuals with schizophrenia who
display specific psychotic symptoms are, in fact, at an increased risk for
committing violence, and “this risk is increased by brain abnormalities,
psychiatric comorbidities, and demographic factors.”9 Another critical
caveat in the relationship between psychosis and violence is how it can be
mediated by effective treatment.10 The risk that an individual in the general
population will commit a homicide is approximately 1 in 25,000.11
Worldwide risk for homicide in first-episode patients with psychosis is one
in 629 presentations, whereas the risk drops to one in 9,090 presentations if
the patient receives treatment.12 Thus, the relationship between psychosis
and risk for violence is mediated by a number of factors. The statistics,
however, do support the argument that early identification and treatment is
the best way to reduce the risk for homicide and violence in patients with
mental illness. This example highlights the complexity of developing
prediction models for future violence and how the models must be flexible
as science progresses.

5. See Douglas & Webster, supra note 1, at 216–19.
6. See, e.g., John Junginger, Psychosis and Violence: The Case for a Content Analysis
of Psychotic Experience, 22 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 91, 91 (1996) (stating that the evidence
suggests “a moderate but reliable association between mental illness and violence” and “that
much of the violent behavior observed in the mentally ill is not random but is motivated and
directed by psychotic symptoms”).
7. See generally PAUL S. APPELBAUM ET AL., RETHINKING RISK ASSESSMENT: THE
MACARTHUR STUDY OF MENTAL DISORDER AND VIOLENCE (2001); Marnie Rice et al., The
Appraisal of Violence Risk, 15 CURRENT OPINION PSYCHIATRY 589 (2002).
8. See Steven Silverstein et al., Schizophrenia and Violence:
Realities and
Recommendations, 1 CRIME PSYCHOL. REV. 21, 21 (2015).
9. Id.
10. See Lyn M. Gaudet et al., Neuroscience of Antisocial Behavior, in THE COGNITIVE
NEUROSCIENCES 1043 (Michael S. Gazzaniga et al. eds., 5th ed. 2014).
11. KENT A. KIEHL, THE PSYCHOPATH WHISPERER: THE SCIENCE OF THOSE WITHOUT
CONSCIENCE 202 (2014).
12. Olav Nielssen & Matthew Large, Rates of Homicide During the First Episode of
Psychosis and After Treatment: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 36 SCHIZOPHRENIA
BULL. 702, 702 (2010).
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A. Clinical Predictions
Arguably, the oldest type of assessment and prediction in forensic
settings was performed by mental health professionals—usually
psychiatrists or psychologists—who would evaluate an individual to
determine if he or she was suffering from any mental health or other
medical conditions and whether he or she was likely to be dangerous in the
future.
These clinical evaluations can either be structured or unstructured.
Clinical predictions using unstructured clinical interviews involve open
questions where the individual being interviewed arguably will have more
freedom to bring up topics and influence the course of the interview. With
the unstructured format, clinicians use their professional judgment and
experience to come to their conclusions regarding the individual’s current
and future functioning and whether they meet the criteria for any
diagnoses.13 The reliability and validity of unstructured interviews is
highly variable because the content and scope of the interview is always
unique and because different clinicians may place varying amounts of
weight on different factors.14 Additionally, clinicians might allow their
emotions, prejudices, or allegiance to one side or the other to influence their
judgments, whereas the goal is to avoid any biases of the evaluator being
able to have an effect on the results.15 Because of the inherent unreliability
that accompanies predictions based on unstructured clinical interviews, they
should not serve as the basis for a formal risk assessment in forensic
settings.
B. Actuarial Predictions
Unlike prediction based on subjective clinical judgment, actuarial
prediction is based on statistical analysis of a subject’s objective
information.16 Multiple actuarial prediction tools have been developed, and
appropriate use of these tools requires selecting the correct tool for the
behavior being predicted and knowing the limitations of the predictive
utility of each tool.
1. Overview
In the past forty years, there has been great progress in the development
of objective tools to assess risk in forensic settings. These tools are referred
to as actuarial methods of risk prediction.17 These methods rely on specific
variables that are weighted in predetermined ways, and the person making
the determination cannot modify those variables or their weighting.18 The
13. See, e.g., Robyn M. Dawes et al., Clinical Versus Actuarial Judgment, 243 SCIENCE
1668, 1668 (1989).
14. Rice et al., supra note 7, at 590.
15. See, e.g., id.
16. See Dawes et al., supra note 13.
17. Rice et al., supra note 7, at 589.
18. See Dawes et al., supra note 13.
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factors used in actuarial models are determined from longitudinal studies of
offenders who are scored on a series of variables prior to release. Over
time, the person conducting the study follows up with the subject to see
which variables predicted future risk.19 Decisions reached by actuarial
methods include positive and negative predictive values, which are
analogous to true positives and negatives. Both positive and negative
predictive values provide the likelihood that an individual indeed belongs to
the projected group. There is now a great deal of literature on the ability of
actuarial tools to reliably predict a variety of outcomes. In the scientific
community, the superiority of actuarial methods to clinical predictions has
been firmly established.20 Examples of commonly used actuarial tools that
have been found to prospectively predict future antisocial behavior include
the Violence Risk Appraisal Guide (VRAG), which predicts violent
behavior, and the Static-99 and Static-2002, which predict recidivism for
sexual offenders.21
Some assessment tools, known as structured clinical judgment tools,
combine clinical and actuarial approaches.22 These tools combine factors
that are known to predict risk with an opportunity for a clinician to exercise
judgment.23 The factors being used may not necessarily be based on
longitudinal data but rather are known to have clinical significance based on
published research. An example is the HCR-20 (historical, clinical, and
risk management scales), which is designed to predict both inpatient
violence and postrelease violence in forensic psychiatric patients.24 It has
been found to have predictive validity in large samples.25 The predictive
utility of the test has been demonstrated in North America, where the tool
was developed, as well as in the United Kingdom.26
2. Static and Dynamic Factors
To understand current approaches to actuarial risk assessment, it is
important to understand the difference between static and dynamic factors.

19. Rice et al., supra note 7, at 590.
20. See, e.g., id. (stating that “[t]he latest work coming from the multi-million-dollar
study of violence risk assessment funded by the MacArthur Foundation stated that actuarial
methods have been sufficiently shown to be superior to clinical methods of prediction
‘[m]ore research demonstrating that the outcome of unstructured clinical assessments left a
great deal to be desired seemed to be overkill: That horse was already dead’” (quoting
APPELBAUM ET AL., supra note 7, at 7)).
21. Grant T. Harris et al., Prospective Replication of the Violence Risk Appraisal Guide
in Predicting Violent Recidivism Among Forensic Patients, 26 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 377
(2002); Leslie M.D. Helmus & R. Karl Hanson, Predictive Validity of the Static-99 and
Static-2002 for Sex Offenders on Community Supervision, SEXUAL OFFENDER TREATMENT
(2007), http://www.sexual-offender-treatment.org/index.php?id=60&type=123 [https://
perma.cc/4D3D-ET2U].
22. See, e.g., Dawes et al., supra note 13, at 1668.
23. See id.
24. Nicola S. Gray et al., Predicting Violent Reconvictions Using the HCR-20, 192 BRIT.
J. PSYCHIATRY 384, 386 (2008).
25. See id.
26. See id. at 384.
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Static factors, such as age at first arrest, are considered stable and do not
change over time. Dynamic factors, such as ongoing alcohol and drug
abuse, living situation, and employment, can change over time and,
consequently, can be targeted by treatment interventions. The most
effective actuarial assessments rely on static factors, whereas dynamic
factors need to be targeted by treatment interventions.27 Consequently, the
most effective tools to predict risk are not the most effective tools to predict
treatment amenability or response to treatment over time. For example, the
VRAG is the preferred assessment tool for predicting violent behavior over
a relatively long period of time.28 The VRAG places an individual into one
of nine overall risk levels, but it is insensitive to identifying intervention
areas or change in risk status since the risk level is determined by the
individual’s largely unchangeable historic and clinical factors.29
C. Psychological and Personality Measures
Psychological and personality assessment instruments were not designed
specifically for the purpose of predicting future antisocial behavior. Yet
some instruments in these categories have demonstrated utility in predicting
different types of outcomes.
1. Neuropsychological Testing
Neuropsychological tests are specifically designed to measure a wide
range of psychological functions that can be linked to structural or
functional compromise of the brain.30 Individual tests generally provide a
broad overview of cognition or focus on task-specific cognitive domains,
such as short-term memory versus long-term memory versus working
memory; visual and auditory attention; expressive and receptive language;
executive function; and processing speed.31 Many of these tests were
developed within the context of evaluating cognition in severe clinical
conditions (e.g., stroke, epilepsy, and dementia), with a goal of establishing
structural-functional relationships between specific brain areas and specific
cognitive skills.32 For example, dysfunction on neuropsychological tests of
verbal short-term memory is linked to structural or functional compromise
of the left hippocampal formation.33

27. See, e.g., Michael S. Caudy et al., How Well Do Dynamix Needs Predict
Recidivism?: Implications for Risk Assessment and Risk Reduction, 41 J. CRIM. JUST. 458,
458 (2013).
28. See Harris et al., supra note 21, at 391.
29. See id. at 379, 385.
30. See John Stratton et al., Murder and Psychosis: Neuropsychological Profiles of
Homicide Offenders with Schizophrenia, CRIM. BEHAV. & MENTAL HEALTH 2 (2016),
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/cbm.1990/epdf [https://perma.cc/BZ6E-ABUB].
31. See id. at 3–5.
32. MURIEL D. LEZAK ET AL., NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT 3 (4th ed. 2004).
33. See e.g., Endel Tulving and Hans J. Markowitsch, Episodic and Declarative
Memory: Role of the Hippocampus, 8 HIPPOCAMPUS 198 (1998).
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In general, neuropsychological dysfunction is established by comparing
an individual client’s data with information in a normative database derived
from several hundred neurotypical control subjects without any evidence of
neurological or psychiatric dysfunction. In making these comparisons, a
degree of age matching is almost always required, as normal levels of
function vary between children, young adults, and seniors. In some cases,
sex matching is also required, and it may be important to consider
additional factors, such as education level, reading skills, and ethnicity.
A 2015 study demonstrates how neuropsychological data and mental
health issues are relevant to the risk of violence.34 The study involved
twenty-five men and women, all of whom were diagnosed with
schizophrenia and had killed another person.35 All twenty-five participants
underwent a neuropsychological evaluation.36 The results were consistent
with prior research indicating “widespread neurocognitive dysfunction
The researchers
among homicide offenders with schizophrenia.”37
concluded that “[c]linicians who treat patients with schizophrenia in
forensic settings should be aware that a combination of low IQ, attentionalexecutive dysfunction, auditory hallucinations, paranoid delusions and prior
criminal history might be a potentially lethal combination.”38
Consequently, an assessment of the neurocognitive status of an individual
through neuropsychological testing is one of the pieces of information that
can offer insight as to the risk that an individual may commit a violent
crime in the future.
There have also been a number of studies that have sought to better
understand the relationship between impulsivity and violence by collecting
neuropsychological and other data from inmates and control subjects, as
well as individuals in the community who have committed acts of violence
but not been referred to the criminal justice or mental health systems.39
Previous neuropsychological research had identified frontal and executive
dysfunction in individuals who had committed violent acts.40 Those
studies, however, did not distinguish between the different types of violence
that was committed, a factor that may have unique neuropsychological
correlates.41 A consistent finding from the neuropsychology literature, in
both criminals and noncriminals, is the inverse relationship between verbal
abilities and impulsive aggression.42 Impairments in executive control
34. See generally Stratton et al., supra note 30.
35. Id. at 1.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 11.
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., Ernest S. Barratt et al., Neuropsychological and Cognitive
Psychophysiological Substrates of Impulsive Aggression, 41 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 1045
(1997); Matthew S. Stanford et al., Neuropsychological Correlates of Self-Reported
Impulsive Aggression in a College Sample, 23 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 961
(1997).
40. See, e.g., Benedetto Vitiello et al., Subtyping Aggression in Children and
Adolescents, 2 J. NEUROPSYCHIATRY & CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCES 189 (1990).
41. Stanford et al., supra note 39, at 961.
42. Barratt et al., supra note 39, at 1047.
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processes were also found in community members who had committed acts
of impulsive aggression, specifically impairments in impulse control and as
verbal strategic processing.43
2. Psychopathic Personality Disorder
Arguably, the single best predictor of criminal behavior and recidivism is
psychopathy.44 Psychopathy is a personality disorder characterized by a
collection of affective and behavioral traits that include a lack of empathy,
guilt, and remorse; shallow affect; early behavioral problems; persistent
irresponsibility; impulsivity; and poor behavioral controls in adulthood.45
Psychopathy is most reliably assessed using the Hare Psychopathy
Checklist (PCL), originally published in 198046 and revised in 1991
(PCL-R), and it is the standard measurement tool for psychopathy in
Administration of the PCL-R includes a
institutional settings.47
semistructured interview and collateral file review.48 The PCL-R includes
twenty items that are scored either as a zero, one, or two.49 A score of zero
is appropriate if the item does not apply to the individual in any aspect of
his or her life.50 A score of one is appropriate if the item applies to some
aspects of the individual’s life.51 And a score of two is appropriate if the
item applies to most aspects of an individual’s life.52 The test is designed to
identify traits. Traits are stable over time and are going to be present in all
of an individual’s interactions with the world in all domains of his or her
life.53
Within one year of release from prison, high-PCL-R scorers are three
times more likely to commit a violent crime than are low scorers.54 Within
ten years of release, over 70 percent of high-PCL-R scorers who have a
history of violence will commit another violent offense. Within twenty
years of release, longitudinal studies suggest that as many as 90 percent of
high-PCL-R scorers who have a history of violence will be rearrested for a

43. Stanford et al., supra note 39, at 964.
44. See, e.g., James F. Hemphill et al., Psychopathy and Recidivism: A Review, 3 LEGAL
& CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 139 (1998).
45. Id. at 139–40.
46. Robert D. Hare, A Research Scale for the Assessment of Psychopathy in Criminal
Populations, 1 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 111 (1980).
47. ROBERT D. HARE, THE HARE PSYCHOPATHY CHECKLIST—REVISED (PCL-R) (1991)
[hereinafter HARE, PCL-R]. For the 2003 update of the manual, see ROBERT D. HARE,
MANUAL FOR THE REVISED PSYCHOPATHY CHECKLIST (2d ed. 2003).
48. See HARE, PCL-R, supra note 47.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. For examples and a review of scoring PCL-R items, see generally KIEHL, supra
note 11.
54. Hemphill et al., supra note 44, at 160; see also Gaudet et al., supra note 10
(discussing psychopathy and recidivism).
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violent crime. The recidivism rate for low-PCL-R violent offenders is
approximately 40 percent.55
The research demonstrates that an assessment of psychopathic
personality traits, when present in high levels (i.e., a score greater than or
equal to thirty out of forty), are at least as predictive as combinations of
traditional risk variables and can add predictive utility beyond criminal
history variables alone.56 Psychopathy also is predictive of the offenders
who are likely to continue to engage in antisocial behavior past the age of
forty, when recidivism rates usually drop off in nonpsychopathic
offenders.57 Because the PCL-R is a reliable and valid measure for
assessing stable personality traits that are associated with violation of norms
and poor behavioral controls, it is not surprising that it is able to predict
both violent and nonviolent criminal recidivism.58
II. APPLICATION OF PREDICTION METHODS
IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM
It is, of course, not easy to predict future behavior. The fact that such a
determination is difficult, however, does not mean that it cannot be made.
Indeed, prediction of future criminal conduct is an essential element in
many of the decisions rendered throughout our criminal justice system.59

Today, just as Justice John Paul Stevens wrote above in 1976, the U.S.
criminal justice system demands predictions of future behavior. And as
Justice Stevens knew then, prediction is used at every level of the system,
from setting bail through sentencing and at parole hearings. In addition,
behavior predictions can impact the general tenets underlying our
punishment structure at the legislative level.
A. Recidivism Rates
One of the ways in which the effectiveness of a criminal justice system is
measured is through recidivism rates. The construct of recidivism,
however, is an extremely broad outcome variable. Recidivism encompasses
all behavior that could result in rearrest. Recidivism can be broken down
into different types, or categories: general/nonviolent recidivism, violent
55. Hemphill et al., supra note 44, at 148; see also Robert D. Hare et al., Psychopathy
and the Predictive Validity of the PCL‐R: An International Perspective, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & L.
623, 638–39 (2000); Grant T. Harris et al., Psychopathy and Violent Recidivism, 15 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 625, 630 (1991); Marnie E. Rice & Grant T. Harris, Cross-Validation and
Extension of the Violence Risk Appraisal Guide for Child Molesters and Rapists, 21 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 231, 236–37 (1997).
56. See Hemphill et al., supra note 44, at 139.
57. Harris, supra note 55, at 633.
58. See, e.g., Kevin S. Douglas, Gina M. Vincent & John F. Edens, Risk for Criminal
Recidivism: The Role of Psychopathy, in HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOPATHY 533 (Christopher J.
Patrick ed., 2006); see also Robert D. Hare & Craig S. Neumann, Psychopathy as a Clinical
and Empirical Construct, 4 ANN. REV. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 217, 218–21 (2008); Randall T.
Salekin et al., A Review and Meta‐Analysis of the Psychopathy Checklist and Psychopathy
Checklist‐Revised: Predictive Validity of Dangerousness, 3 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 203 (1996).
59. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 274–75 (1976).
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recidivism, sexual recidivism, and sexually violent recidivism. Those
categories can be broken down further until there is a specific behavior that
can be operationalized so that it can be assessed, quantified, and studied in a
meaningful way.
General-level data does serve a purpose nonetheless. Returning to the
overall construct of recidivism, the Bureau of Justice Statistics within the
U.S. Department of Justice compiles reports regarding the number of
released individuals who return to prison, providing a rough measure of the
effectiveness of the criminal justice system in deterring those incarcerated
from returning to criminal behavior.60 In 2005, 67 percent of the 404,638
state prisoners released in thirty states were arrested within three years of
release, and 76 percent were arrested within five years.61 Approximately 50
percent of inmates released in twenty-three states had a parole or probation
violation or an arrest that led to subsequent imprisonment within three
years.62
These general recidivism rates are examples of the macrolevel analysis
that makes its way into the criminal justice system. More select and
specific examples of predictive tools, including both clinical and actuarial
tools, commonly make their way into the justice system at both the case
level and parole-hearing level as well.
B. Legal Decisions Involving
Predictions of Future Dangerousness
Civil commitment determinations are one example of legal proceedings
that rely heavily on predictions of future behavior. Civil commitment is the
confinement of an ill, incompetent, drug-addicted, or similar person outside
of the criminal justice system.63 As early as 1905, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that “the liberty secured by the Constitution of the United States to
every person within its jurisdiction does not import an absolute right in each
person to be, at all times and in all circumstances, wholly freed from
restraint.”64 The security and prosperity of the state allowed for this
“reasonable” restriction of liberty.65 More recently, the Court has reiterated
that the citizens’ right to liberty is not absolute, but has long been subject to
restraint in “certain narrow circumstances.”66 As long as procedural and
evidentiary conditions are met, the involuntary civil commitment of
dangerous persons “is [not] contrary to our understanding of ordered
60. See Recidivism, BUREAU JUST. STAT., http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=17
(last visited Oct. 16, 2016) [https://perma.cc/YA4C-KQ5Z].
61. MATTHEW DUROSE ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS
RELEASED IN 30 STATES IN 2005: PATTERNS FROM 2005 TO 2010, at 28 (2014), http://
www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rprts05p0510.pdf [https://perma.cc/9UUA-XGQX].
62. Id.
63. Civil Commitment, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
64. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905).
65. Id. (citing Mo., Kan. & Tex. Ry. Co. v. Haber, 169 U.S. 613, 628–29 (1898); R.R. v.
Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 471 (1877); Thorpe v. Rutland & Burlington R.R., 27 Vt. 140, 148
(1855)).
66. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 357 (1997).
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liberty.”67 In rejecting challenges to the civil commitment of sexual
offenders under substantive due process, double jeopardy, and ex post facto
theories, the Court has explained that civil commitment of sexually violent
predators is allowable when future dangerousness is linked to a “‘mental
abnormality’ or ‘personality disorder’ that makes it difficult, if not
impossible, for the person to control his dangerous behavior.”68
Clinical assessments have long been used in civil commitment
proceedings. In fact, since civil commitment hearings first began,
psychiatrists have been allowed to offer their opinions on the ultimate
issues before the judge—whether a potential patient is mentally ill,
dangerous, or in need of treatment.69 This same latitude has been afforded
to psychiatrists in criminal proceedings as well, where they have been
allowed to not only make diagnoses, but to predict whether or not a
defendant was likely to commit acts of violence in the future.70
Psychiatric prediction of future behavior has been called into question
and challenged strongly in court.71 In a series of three cases, the Supreme
Court has, however, upheld the use of psychiatrists to assess and testify to
their opinions on a defendant’s future dangerousness.72 Despite the Court’s
acknowledgement that such psychiatric predictions “may be countered not
only as erroneous in a particular case but also as generally so unreliable that
[they] should be ignored,” the Court has continued to allow for their
admission in sentencing decisions.73
In Jurek v. Texas,74 the defendant argued that the Texas statute
permitting the jury to impose the death penalty violated the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments because it required the jury to predict the
defendant’s future behavior.75 Under Texas law, the jury was statutorily
required to find “a probability that the defendant would commit criminal
acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society” in
order to sentence a defendant to death.76 In Jurek, however, the Court held
“[t]he task that a Texas jury must perform in answering the statutory
question in issue is thus basically no different from the task performed
countless times each day throughout the American system of criminal

67. Id. (recognizing the colonial and early American history of civil commitment
statutes and the Court’s consistent upholding of “such involuntary commitment statutes
provided the confinement takes place pursuant to proper procedures and evidentiary
standards”).
68. Id. at 358. It is worth noting that this view is not without substantial controversy,
and civil commitment continues to be heavily litigated.
69. See, e.g., Bruce J. Ennis & Thomas R. Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of
Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 693, 694 (1974).
70. See generally Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
71. See id. at 899–901.
72. See generally Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994); Barefoot, 463 U.S.
880; Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
73. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 882.
74. 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
75. See id. at 268.
76. Id.
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justice.”77 As a result, the Court held that so long as the jury has all
possible and relevant information in front of it, even lay people are allowed
to assess and predict future dangerousness.78
A more direct challenge to the use and effectiveness of clinical future
prediction came before the Court less than ten years later in Barefoot v.
Estelle.79 There, the defendant argued that psychiatrists, both at the
individual level and as a group, did such a poor job at actually predicting
when a defendant would be a future danger to the community that they
should be prevented from testifying to such opinions altogether.80
Surprisingly, the American Psychiatric Association (APA) supported the
defendant’s argument, and in a brief to the Court explained that such
psychiatric testimony is so unreliable that the jury and system will not be
competent to recognize and evaluate its shortcomings.81 The Court again
disagreed, this time citing Jurek’s allowance of a lay jury’s ability to predict
future dangerousness as support.82 Given Jurek’s holding, “it makes little
sense, if any, to submit that psychiatrists, out of the entire universe of
persons who might have an opinion on the issue, would know so little about
the subject that they should not be permitted to testify.”83 Additionally,
Barefoot drew on the fact that there was no suggestion that psychiatrists
were always wrong in predicting future dangerousness, but rather only that
they were wrong most of the time, as enough to pass the bar for
admission.84
In the third case in this series, Simmons v. South Carolina,85 the Court
limited Jurek and Barefoot. The Simmons Court held that in capital cases
where the prosecution predicts a defendant will be a future danger, the trial
court must inform the jury that the only possible alternative sentence, other
than death, is life imprisonment without parole.86 More important for this
Article’s purpose, however, is what the Court did not hold. Specifically,
the jury is still free to predict whether or not the defendant will be a future
danger to those within a prison or to the greater community outside the
prison through the use of an outside agent or group. Specifically in regard
to the admissibility of future prediction tools, the Court did not limit, in any
way, the admissibility of the argument that the defendant will be a future
danger to such groups—i.e., fellow inmates, guards, and administrators in
the prison or the outside community through an agent—despite the fact that
such predictions of future dangerousness are even less likely to be reliable
given the low rate of future violence for capital offenders in custody.

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 275–76.
See id. at 276.
463 U.S. 880 (1983).
Id. at 884–85.
See id. at 920–22.
Id. at 897–98.
Id. at 897.
Id. at 901.
512 U.S. 154 (1994).
See id. at 161–62.

2016]

PREDICTING ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOR

515

While psychiatric predictions of future dangerousness have clearly been
allowed in court as expert opinion testimony, their continued use is not
without question. As noted above, claims that psychiatric predictions of
future dangerousness are worse than chance have previously been
ineffective at excluding such evidence.87 But with the Supreme Court’s
decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,88 questions over
whether clinical assessments alone can meet the new threshold reliability
requirement have gained traction. Daubert’s requirement that expert
evidence meet a benchmark level of reliability before the court opens the
gate to its use in trial89 is in line with the APA’s contention in Barefoot that
expert opinion evidence needs to have threshold indices of reliability before
it is eligible to be considered as evidence.90 And yet, courts have not
widely found that expert opinions based on clinical predictions of future
dangerousness fail Daubert. Although some state-level cases have applied
the Daubert test to clinical predictions, there has been no Supreme Court
challenge to settle Daubert’s impact on Barefoot.
In Texas, Coble v. State91 addressed whether a clinical assessment,
specifically the prosecution’s forensic psychiatrist’s testimony about the
defendant’s future dangerousness, was done reliably enough to be
admissible under Daubert.92 The court found it was not.93 The fact that the
expert failed to cite any journals, articles, or books related to his predictive
assessment, and that he had never gone back to review any of the prior
assessments he had done to determine if or what his error rate may be, led
the court to hold that he failed to meet his burden of proving scientific
reliability.94
Coble, however, does not stand for the proposition that all clinical
predictive assessments of future dangerousness fail Daubert. In fact, the
court went to some length to explain that another psychiatrist, who does not
repeat this expert’s mistakes, could pass the Daubert test for predicting
future dangerousness.95 However, the opinion’s footnotes laid out a much
more skeptical reading of whether the necessary support ever could be
provided. In one particular footnote, the court outlined how studies on
predictions of violence from as early as 1974 show that the state of the
science is unproven and unsatisfactory.96 Other citations pointed to
research showing that actuarial prediction tools are superior to clinical
prediction and that psychiatrists are usually no better at assessing future
violence than the layperson.97
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

See, e.g., id.; Barefoot, 463 U.S. 880.
509 U.S. 579 (1993).
Id. at 589.
See Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 920–23.
330 S.W.3d 253 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
See id. at 277–80.
Id. at 279–80.
Id. at 277–80.
See id.
Id. at 278 n.63.
Id. at 278 nn.63 & 65.
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Early in the same year that Coble was decided, the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals had evaluated another Daubert challenge to psychiatric
predictions of future violence in Davis v. State.98 The Daubert challenge in
Davis had not been properly preserved at the trial level by the defense, and
the appellant made no affirmative demonstration of why the expert opinions
failed Daubert other than to say that the prosecution failed to show the
experts were qualified and their opinions were reliable.99 Noting this flaw,
the court nonetheless continued to evaluate the experts and their
methodologies sua sponte.
The prosecution had proffered evidence from a psychiatrist and a
psychologist regarding future dangerousness.100 After detailing their
background, the court explained that the psychiatrist was able to describe
his method for assessing future dangerousness as a combination of both
actuarial and anamnestic method101 (a refined version of clinical prediction,
which “looks at the person in context and over time, examining and
learning from his or her life story”102). His assessment involved looking at
the presence or absence of factors most strongly associated with a risk of
future violence, looking at the defendant’s background for factors that
aggravate or mitigate violence, along with demographic information,
among other factors.103 Additionally, whereas the psychiatrist had
interviewed the defendant directly, the psychologist, whose assessment was
based on two actuarial tools, had not.104 The psychologist used the HCR-20
and the Hare Psychopathy Checklist to determine if the defendant was at a
low, medium, or high risk to commit future violent acts.105
With no other direct challenge to these experts brought by the appellant,
the court held that both passed Daubert.106 But, Davis did so with the
following caveat:
In determining whether evidence derived from a “soft science” such as
psychology is sufficiently reliable, we examine: (1) whether the field of
expertise is a legitimate one, (2) whether the subject matter of the expert’s
testimony is within the scope of that field, and (3) whether the expert’s
testimony properly relies upon and/or utilizes the principles involved in
the field.107

The relaxed Daubert requirements for “soft science” in Texas, thus, may
have allowed for the admission of evidence in Davis that otherwise may or

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

313 S.W.3d 317 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
Id. at 352–53.
Id. at 353.
Id.
Jeffrey L. Metzner & Joel A. Dvoskin, Psychiatry in Correctional Settings, in THE
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC PUBLISHING TEXTBOOK OF FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 377, 385 (Robert
I. Simon & Liza H. Gold eds., 2004).
103. Davis, 313 S.W.3d. at 353–54.
104. Id. at 354.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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may not have passed the full Daubert analysis.108 The addition of actuarial
tools also could be what distinguishes an assessment of future
dangerousness as sufficiently reliable to pass Daubert in comparison to a
pure clinical assessment alone.109
Actuarial tools are used widely in one particular area of the legal system:
the evaluation and civil commitment of sex offenders. The use of these
actuarial instruments has been challenged widely under the pre-Daubert
standard, as articulated in Frye v. United States,110 but not nearly as much
under Daubert itself.111 And interestingly, in some cases, even when a
Frye challenge has been made, courts have found that actuarial prediction
assessments do not fall under the realm of “scientific evidence” as defined
in Frye.112 In the few civil commitment challenges that do invoke Daubert,
the court has noted that Daubert does not apply in that jurisdiction.113
Despite the lack of a widespread admissibility standard for this type of
evidence and the continued criticisms regarding reliability, the U.S.
criminal justice system has long relied on, and will foreseeably continue to
rely on, both clinical and actuarial assessments of future violence. Legal
challenges to these instruments have had little effect on their systematic
use, and the need for prediction measures is too great.
III. NEUROSCIENCE AND PREDICTION
With a recognized need and no perfect prediction tool available, it is
more than reasonable to consider what other tools are available that can add
to the overall reliability of a final prediction. The two forensic
neuroscience studies discussed below are examples of how the inclusion of
neuroscientific information can add to the overall confidence of an
antisocial behavior prediction analysis. The first study used structural
neuroimaging techniques to assess maturity, whereas the second used
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
111. See Garcetti v. Superior Court, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 214, 217 (Ct. App. 2000)
(reversing the trial court’s finding that the use of Static-99 was not reliable enough).
112. Compare People v. Donelson, No. G031920, 2004 WL 1386352 (Cal. Ct. App. June
22, 2004) (finding that if the defendant had not failed to preserve the challenge, Static-99
would have been admissible, but it would not have been subject to Frye), and People v.
Valadao, No. H023662, 2002 WL 31895664 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2002) (rejecting the
claim that Static-99 violated due process and stating that Frye does not apply to expert
opinions concerning future dangerousness), with In re Commitment of Lourash, 807 N.E.2d
1269 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (holding that, because general acceptance in relevant scientific
community is required, a Frye hearing is necessary for Static-99 opinion testimony), and In
re Detention of Hargett, 786 N.E.2d 557 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (holding that testimony based
on actuarial instruments (MNSOST-R and Static-99) constitutes scientific evidence subject
to Frye).
113. See, e.g., In re Johnson, No. 01-1151, 2002 WL 31309172, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct.
16, 2002) (finding that Daubert analysis of actuarial instruments (MNSOST, MNSOST-R,
Static-99, and RRASOR) is not required, but the evidence still must be relevant and assist
the trier of fact; the witness must be qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education; and any potential for possible exaggeration by the expert still should
be considered).
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functional neuroimaging measures to predict recidivism. Together, they
provide a glimpse of the potential that advancing neuroscience may be able
to contribute to improved prediction.
A. Chronological Age Versus Brain Age
One avenue in which neuroscience-based measures aid in prediction is in
the quantification of variables that have already been identified for their
importance in understanding human behavior. Consider this practical
example: age is a powerful variable in the prediction of many behavioral
and health-related outcomes. It would be difficult to find an auto insurance
or medical insurance program that does not consider age in its actuarial
models. Likewise, one’s age features prominently in most estimates of the
likelihood for antisocial behavior.114 Indeed, if we consider the release of
two inmates from prison, a twenty-five-year-old and a thirty-five-year-old,
all else being equal, the twenty-five-year-old is roughly 25 percent more
likely to be reincarcerated within five years following his or her release than
the thirty-five-year-old.115 Age also features prominently in our decisions
about holding people accountable for their behavior, as our treatment of
juvenile offenders is categorically different than that of adults.116
Why does age carry so much weight in our expectation and judgment of
individual behavior? For one, age is a very convenient, though imperfect,
proxy for a trait that is somewhat more difficult to quantify: maturity. As
we age, we gain experience, we are more familiar with and more likely to
consider a wider range of consequences, and we are less likely to act
impulsively.117 The disciplines of psychology and neuroscience can help us
understand some of the developmental and physiological mechanisms
responsible for these predictable changes in behavior. Not surprisingly, our
brains change dramatically as we age. Physical changes in the brain have a
strong influence on the cognitive changes in behavior and decision making
that we associate with maturity.118 These dramatic changes in brain
structure and function are measurable with modern neuroscience
techniques.
Adolescence is a particularly important period of neural development,
and it provides us with a good model for how physical changes in the brain
influence behavior. Adolescence and young adulthood are quite fairly
characterized by susceptibility to impulsive, emotionally motivated
behavior, and conspicuous limitations in behavioral inhibition.119 These
114. DUROSE ET AL., supra note 61; Paul Gendreau et al., A Meta‐Analysis of the
Predictors of Adult Offender Recidivism: What Works!, 34 CRIMINOLOGY 575 (1996).
115. DUROSE ET AL., supra note 61.
116. See generally Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
117. See Julia Deakin et al., Risk Taking During Decision-Making in Normal Volunteers
Changes with Age, 10 J. INT’L NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL SOC’Y 590, 597 (2004).
118. See B.J. Casey et al., Structural and Functional Brain Development and Its Relation
to Cognitive Development, 54 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 241, 244–46 (2000); B.J. Casey et al.,
The Adolescent Brain, 1124 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 111 (2008).
119. See generally L.P. Spear, The Adolescent Brain and Age-Related Behavioral
Manifestations, 24 NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAVIORAL REVIEWS 417 (2000).
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changes are more subtle and complex than one might first realize. For
instance, research has shown that it is not simply a lack of knowledge or
experience that leads to different decision making among youth; rather,
these differences appear to stem from fundamentally different tolerances for
risk and evaluation of reward.120 These changes are at least partially due to
normal age-related cellular and neurochemical changes in the brain.
Of course, there is variability among individuals in this developmental
course. Just as we understand that all ten-year-olds do not exhibit the same
levels of maturity, we should also recognize that there are many
biologically derived changes that promote the variation that we typically
attribute to aging and development. Furthermore, the brain continues to
change over time with increasing age. Starting in early adulthood, almost
all brain regions decrease in volume as gray matter is lost.121 Many internal
and external factors influence the progression of these biological changes.
Education, physical exercise, nutrition, stress, genetics, and social
experiences all change the brain in meaningful ways. One reason that
neuroscience holds so much promise for understanding behavior is that all
of these variables converge by measurably changing the brain’s structure
and function. Understanding that these cellular and neurochemical
processes are at the root of what we might recognize as age-related changes
in behavior and cognition gets us one step closer to a more precise way to
quantify development. Perhaps most importantly for our purposes here, it is
reasonable to suspect that these neural changes may be more proximately
related to observable behavior than to chronological age, which ignores any
individual variability in actual brain maturation.
B. Structural Neuroimaging Data Predicts Recidivism
A recent study examined the relative utility of neuroimaging measures
compared to chronological age in the prediction of antisocial behavior.122
Because age is a very strong predictor of recidivism, it was hypothesized
that neural correlates of age derived from structural magnetic resonance
imaging (sMRI) data could be used in place of chronological age in a
prediction model. Their research question essentially asked: What is a
better predictor of recidivism—chronological age, which is more
traditionally used in prediction models, or brain age, which is theoretically
more sensitive to the biological differences that actually influence our
behavior?
120. See generally Valerie F. Reyna & Frank Farley, Risk and Rationality in Adolescent
Decision-Making: Implications for Theory, Practice, and Public Policy, 7 PSYCHOL. SCI.
PUB. INT. 1 (2006); Laurence Steinberg, Risk Taking in Adolescence: New Perspectives from
Brain and Behavioral Science, 16 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 55 (2007).
121. See Judith M. Segall et al., Correspondence Between Structure and Function in the
Human Brain at Rest, FRONTIERS NEUROINFORMATICS (Mar. 27, 2012), http://
journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fninf.2012.00010/full
[https://perma.cc/W9DM-84
B5]. See generally Naftali Raz et al., Regional Brain Changes in Aging Healthy Adults:
General Trends, Individual Differences and Modifiers, 15 CEREBRAL CORTEX 1676 (2005).
122. Robert Whelan & Hugh Garavan, When Optimism Hurts: Inflated Predictions in
Psychiatric Neuroimaging, 75 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 746, 747 (2014).
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To test this question, the research team examined MRI data from over
1,300 incarcerated males across a wide range of ages, from juvenile
offenders to older adults (i.e., ages twelve to sixty-five). They employed an
analytic technique that divides the brain into smaller partitions of gray
matter that change in step with one another across individuals. As
discussed above, the entire brain does not change uniformly with age;
rather, these changes occur locally, in critical time-windows of
development. Out of thirty partitions of gray matter, nineteen were chosen
for their strong association with age. The volume and density of these
nineteen brain circuits changed systematically across individuals in a
manner consistent with aging processes. These volume and density
measures across individuals were combined to express a kind of “brain age”
measure, in contrast to their chronological age using date of birth.
After identifying the brain-age-related measures, the analyses were
replicated on another independent sample. As in the first sample, the brainage components were highly predictive of chronological age in the
replication sample. For technical statistical reasons, it is important that
these individuals were not used in the initial identification of the predictor
variables.123 Finally, because the research team had already determined
who among this second group had remained out of prison and who had been
reincarcerated following release, they could calculate and test prediction
models. A series of models were developed to assess which variables
predicted reoffending in this sample. These analyses confirmed that the
brain-age measures outperformed chronological age in calculating how
likely an individual was to be reincarcerated. Specifically, reduced gray
matter in the anterior temporal lobes, amygdala, and orbital frontal cortex
was more helpful in predicting rearrest than was chronological age.124

123. Id.
124. For a full account of this research, see generally Kent A. Kiehl et al., Age of Gray
Matters: Neuroprediction of Recidivism (The Mind Research Network, Working Paper,
2016).

2016]

PREDICTING ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOR

521

Figure 1: Structural Neuroimaging Prediction
of Future Antisocial Behavior

The areas in blue (this figure can be found in color at
http://fordhamlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Gaudet
KerkmansAndersonKiehl_November.pdf) depict brain gray matter
measures that were highly predictive of future antisocial behavior. The
regions are also part of a “brain age” algorithm, in that these regions
change over time with age. The regions include orbital frontal cortex and
anterior temporal lobe structures.

The brain areas implicated in this study are not only known to change
with age, but they also are reasonable targets for assessing the relationship
between antisocial behavior and neural function. The amygdala, for
instance, plays an important role in detecting threatening stimuli in our
environment as well as in reinforcement learning—i.e., learning about
rewards and punishments.125 Abnormalities in the structure and function of
the amygdala have been associated with chronic antisocial behavior and
psychopathic personality traits.126 The frontal cortex is largely responsible
for complex “executive functions” of the brain, such as decision making,
planning ahead, and behavioral control.127 The lower (inferior) portions of
the frontal cortex (e.g., the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and the
orbitofrontal cortex) are especially important for the prediction of
consequences and incorporating learned reinforcement contingencies into
125. See generally Michael Davis & Paul J. Whalen, The Amygdala: Vigilance and
Emotion, 6 MOLECULAR PSYCHIATRY 13 (2001); Christine I. Hooker et al., Amygdala
Response to Facial Expressions Reflects Emotional Learning, 26 J. NEUROSCIENCE 8915
(2006).
126. See R.J.R. Blair, The Amygdala and Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex in Morality and
Psychopathy, 11 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 387 (2007); Kent A. Kiehl, A Cognitive
Neuroscience Perspective on Psychopathy: Evidence for Paralimbic System Dysfunction,
142 PSYCHIATRY RES. 107 (2006); Kent A. Kiehl et al., Limbic Abnormalities in Affective
Processing by Criminal Psychopaths as Revealed by Functional Magnetic Resonance
Imaging, 50 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 677, 677 (2001).
127. See generally John Duncan & Adrian M. Owen, Common Regions of the Human
Frontal Lobe Recruited by Diverse Cognitive Demands, 23 TRENDS NEUROSCIENCE 475
(2000).
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Dysfunction and abnormal structural
ongoing decision making.128
properties in these frontal regions likewise have been prominently
associated with antisocial behavior, psychopathic traits, and disorders of
behavioral control.129 The anterior temporal cortex has complex functional
properties that have been associated with social and emotional cognition,
including theory of mind reasoning—i.e., taking someone else’s perspective
and moral judgment.130 Dysfunction and abnormal structure here has been
associated with unstable mood and irritability, psychopathic traits, and
abnormal moral processing.131
No brain operates in isolation, and when considering brain-behavior
relationships, one should be careful to consider the functionally integrated
roles that are observable when several brain regions cooperate. The regions
identified here for their predictive utility in estimating recidivism are
conspicuously implicated together for their role in a larger network of brain
regions sometimes referred to as the paralimbic system.132 This system has
been extensively studied for its prominent role in differentiating individuals
with psychopathic personality traits and chronic antisocial behavior.133
Further, understanding these relationships arms us with highly useful
information for addressing specific pathophysiological etiological
mechanisms underlying certain instances of deviant behavior and
addressing these by developing novel treatment and intervention
strategies.134
C. Functional Neuroimaging Data Predicts Recidivism
Impulsivity, or behavioral disinhibition, is one of the strongest and most
studied risk factors for recidivism.135 Risk assessments, personality tests,
128. C. Daniel Salzman & Stefano Fusi, Emotion, Cognition, and Mental State
Representation in Amygdala and Prefrontal Cortex, 33 ANN. REV. NEUROSCIENCE 173, 180–
81 (2010).
129. See R.J.R. Blair, supra note 126, at 387. See generally Yaling Yang & Adrian Raine,
Prefrontal Structural and Functional Brain Imaging Findings in Antisocial, Violent, and
Psychopathic Individuals: A Meta-Analysis, 174 PSYCHIATRY RES. 81 (2009).
130. See Ingrid R. Olson et al., Social Cognition and the Anterior Temporal Lobes: A
Review and Theoretical Framework, 8 SOC. COGNITIVE & AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE 123
(2013); Ingrid R. Olson et al., The Enigmatic Temporal Pole: A Review of Findings on
Social and Emotional Processing, 130 BRAIN 1718 (2007).
131. See Elsa E. Ermer et al., Aberrant Paralimbic Gray Matter in Criminal Psychopathy,
121 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 649 (2012); Elsa E. Ermer et al., Aberrant Paralimbic Gray
Matter in Incarcerated Male Adolescents with Psychopathic Traits, 52 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD
& ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 94 (2013); Gulia Glosser et al., Psychiatric Aspects of
Temporal Lobe Epilepsy Before and After Anterior Temporal Lobectomy, 68 J. NEUROLOGY
NEUROSURGERY & PSYCHIATRY 53 (2000).
132. Raymond Salvador et al., Neurophysiological Architecture of Functional Magnetic
Resonance Images of Human Brain, 15 CEREBRAL CORTEX 1332, 1336 (2005).
133. See generally Nathaniel E. Anderson & Kent A. Kiehl, The Psychopath Magnetized:
Insights from Brain Imaging, 16 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 52 (2012).
134. See Nathaniel E. Anderson & Kent A. Kiehl, Psychopathy: Developmental
Perspectives and Their Implications for Treatment, 32 RESTORATIVE NEUROLOGY &
NEUROSCIENCE 103 (2014).
135. Grant T. Harris et al., Violent Recidivism of Mentally Disordered Offenders: The
Development of a Statistical Prediction Instrument, 20 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 315 (1993).
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and neuropsychological testing have all found that higher impulsivity is
associated with increased risk for future antisocial behavior. All of these
techniques rely on proxy measures of the brain’s inhibitory and cognitive
control systems; therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that a more direct
measure of these systems through functional neuroimaging could lend
incremental utility to the prediction of antisocial behavior.136
In 2013, the first prospective forensic neuroprediction study was
published.137 The study collected neuroimaging data from approximately
one hundred offenders prior to their release.138 The experiment studied
whether brain activity could predict which offenders would be rearrested
after release. Brain activity was measured using the functional MRI (fMRI)
technique as offenders completed a task known to engage inhibitory
processes. The task is known as a “Go/No-Go task,” and it requires that the
participant respond to some stimuli (“Go trials”) and withhold a response to
other stimuli (“No-Go trials”).139
The brain regions and circuits involved in impulse control, also referred
to as response inhibition, are well documented.140 The brain regions
involved include the basal ganglia, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, and
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC).141 The ACC is thought to play a central
role in the error-monitoring circuit, where it receives error-related
information from the basal ganglia and frontal cortex to motor areas.142
There is a great deal of animal and human neuroimaging data that provides
evidence of the importance of the ACC in the ability to learn and regulate
behavior; that, during error conflicts, ACC activity increases and improves
cognitive control; and that the ACC is a highly engaged region during the
specific Go/No Go functional neuroimaging task used in the study.143 With
that in mind, the specific hypothesis tested by the study was whether ACC
activity during the Go/No Go task would contribute to the prediction of

136. Eyal Aharoni et al., Neuroprediction of Future Rearrest, 110 PROC. NAT’L ACAD.
SCI. 6223, 6223 (2013).
137. See generally id.
138. See id.
139. Michael C. Stevens et al., Brain Network Dynamics During Error Commission, 30
HUM. BRAIN MAPPING 24, 26 (2009).
140. Aharoni et al., supra note 136, at 6223.
141. Id.
142. Id.; see also Clay B. Holroyd & Michael G.H. Coles, The Neural Basis of Human
Error Processing: Reinforcement Learning, Dopamine, and the Error-Related Negativity,
109 PSYCHOL. REV. 679, 679 (2002).
143. See, e.g., Aharoni et al., supra note 136, at 6223; Orrin Devinsky et al.,
Contributions of Anterior Cingulate Cortex to Behaviour, 118 BRAIN 279 (1995); M. Gabriel
et al., Anterior and Medial Thalamic Lesions, Discriminative Avoidance Learning, and
Cingulate Cortical Neuronal Activity in Rabbits, 76 EXPERIMENTAL BRAIN RES. 441 (1989);
John G. Kerns et al., Anterior Cingulate Conflict Monitoring and Adjustments in Control,
303 SCIENCE 1023 (2004); Kent Kiehl et al., Error Processing and the Rostral Anterior
Cingulate: An Event‐Related fMRI Study, 37 PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 216 (2000); Vincent van
Veen & Cameron Carter, The Anterior Cingulate as a Conflict Monitor: fMRI and ERP
Studies, 77 PHYSIOLOGY & BEHAV. 477 (2002).
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antisocial behavior in a longitudinal study of criminal offenders scanned
prior to their release.144
Supporting the study hypothesis, ACC activity predicted recidivism
above and beyond traditional risk assessment measures.145 Within the fouryear follow-up period after release, inmates with low ACC activity were
four times more likely to be rearrested for a nonviolent crime than inmates
with high ACC activity.146
Figure 2: Functional Neuroimaging Prediction
of Future Antisocial Behavior

Activity within the anterior cingulate cortex elicited during an inhibitory
task predicted recidivism above and beyond other measures of
impulsivity. This figure is a survival curve for predicting rearrest for
nonviolent crimes only. The probability that offenders with low anterior
cingulate activity (group 1; dotted line) would be rearrested for a
nonviolent crime was 31 percent compared to 52 percent for offenders
with high anterior cingulate activity (group 2; solid line).147

IV. COMMON CRITIQUES OF PREDICTION METHODS
It is a complex and difficult enterprise to predict human behavior,
particularly abnormal human social behavior. Consequently there is no
perfect prediction tool. However, there are tools that are better suited to
144. Aharoni et al., supra note 136, at 6223.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. The original figure appears as figure S2 in the supporting information section of
Aharoni et al., supra note 136.
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different contexts than others, and there are improvements being made in
our understanding of different types of antisocial behavior. The sections
below discuss common criticisms levied at various methods and provides
responses to those critiques.
A. Clinical
As summarized above, clinical predictions of future behavior vary widely
based on clinical and subjective criteria that are, unfortunately, more often
wrong than right.148 One of the consistent findings regarding clinical
predictions of dangerousness is that psychiatrists overpredict; meaning, for
a large number of individuals a psychiatrist believes to be dangerous, if
those individuals were released, they would not in fact harm themselves or
others.149 It has been estimated that even with “the most careful,
painstaking, laborious, and lengthy clinical approach to the prediction of
dangerousness, false positives may be at a minimum of 60 to 70
[percent].”150
Since the 1970s, scholars have questioned the wisdom of allowing
psychiatrists such latitude in predictions of behavior, particularly future
dangerousness. A 1974 law review publication coauthored by an attorney
and a psychologist explained that the legal community simply must be
unaware of the large and consistent literature that questions both the
reliability and validity of psychiatric predictions.151 The authors sought to
persuade courts to seriously limit the scope of psychiatric testimony,
particularly in civil commitment proceedings.152 As the case law reviewed
above demonstrates, their belief was misplaced. Even after courts learned
about the questions surrounding this type of psychiatric testimony, the
judiciary has not changed the scope and type of testimony that psychiatrists
can offer to predict future dangerousness.
B. Actuarial
In response to the poor predictive utility of clinical assessments alone,
the use of evidence-based actuarial predictions has grown significantly in
the legal system over the past few decades. It was the need for more
reliable and valid measures that drove scientists to create actuarial models.
While evidence-based actuarial methods are the preferred form of risk
assessments, it is essential that the appropriate assessment technique be
used to address the particular individual and issue at hand. Use of an
incorrect assessment technique negates the reliability and validity the tool
may have established in other contexts.
148. See JOHN MONAHAN & HENRY J. STEADMAN, VIOLENCE AND MENTAL DISORDER:
DEVELOPMENTS IN RISK ASSESSMENT (1996).
149. Rice et al., supra note 7, at 589.
150. Ennis & Litwack, supra note 69, at 714 (quoting Bernard Rubin, Prediction of
Dangerousness in Mentally Ill Criminals, 27 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY. 397, 397–98
(1972)).
151. Id. at 695.
152. Id. at 696.
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There are multiple types of reliability and validity, all of which bear on
the utility of different risk assessments in different contexts. For example,
external validity is the degree to which results of an experiment, or risk
assessment tool in this case, can be generalized to other contexts. External
validity is a construct of considerable importance when using psychological
and psychiatric tools to inform forensic decision making, yet it is not
routinely studied in the legal literature. For example, one of the creators of
the Classification of Violence Risk (COVR) assessment, Dr. John
Monahan, explains that the COVR is valid only when applied to acute
psychiatric patients in inpatient facilities.153 He questions the external
validity of the COVR when applied to normal offender populations and
other groups until empirical research can determine the validity of such
application.154 Despite this admonition, the COVR is routinely used to
assess risk of violence in offenders that are not acute psychiatric patients.155
Using the assessment tool on a population other than that for which it was
developed reduces the confidence in the result of the assessment. External
validity is not an issue with an instrument itself but with its application.
And forensic decision makers need to be cognizant of the specific
application of the instrument being used.
Another important finding regarding the use of actuarial assessments are
some of the practical differences between use of these tools in research
studies versus their use in the real world. In research studies, a small
number of individuals score a large number of cases, making them
experienced with the instrument itself and its application. In practice,
however, individuals in the criminal justice system may only use a
particular tool occasionally, and they may use a wide variety of tools in
their jobs, so their familiarity with any one instrument may be relatively
low. California mandates the use of the Static-99 for offenders on their
sexual offender registry.156 A 2014 study examined the reliability and
validity of the Static-99 and Static-99R as implemented in the State of
California. While the overall study results found high predictive accuracy
of the Static-99 and Static-99R, they found meaningful differences in scores
based on the scoring experience of the probation and parole officers
completing the assessment and based on how much supervision they had
while completing the assessment.157 It was discovered that practice scoring
of twenty to twenty-five cases, prior to administering the assessment on
actual offenders, provides an appropriate tradeoff between increased costs
associated with training and supervision and the increased reliability gained
in the assessment’s administration.158 This study serves as a reminder that

153. See generally John Monahan et al., An Actuarial Model of Violence Risk Assessment
for Persons with Mental Disorders, 56 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 810 (2005).
154. Id. at 815.
155. Id.
156. See R. Karl Hanson et al., The Field Validity of Static-99/R Sex Offender Risk
Assessment Tool in California, 1 J. THREAT ASSESSMENT & MGMT. 102, 103 (2014).
157. Id. at 107.
158. Id.
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there are practical considerations to using an actuarial assessment and that
sufficient training is required to apply these instruments properly.
C. Neuropsychology
In considering the utility of neuropsychological testing in forensic
situations, it is important to keep in mind that most neuropsychological tests
were developed to identify deficits in conditions of gross pathology. There
is mounting evidence that a typical neuropsychological test battery has
limited sensitivity to mild cognitive deficits,159 which can nevertheless
substantially compromise performance and quality of life.
Despite some limitations in sensitivity, neuropsychological tests have
demonstrated utility in predicting important and forensically relevant
outcomes, an example of which is identifying the patients that will or will
not successfully complete treatment.
Impaired performance on
neuropsychological testing has been found to predict treatment dropout in
patients with cocaine dependence.160 Further work confirmed that patients
who drop out of treatment have significantly lower cognitive functioning
scores compared to patients who were able to complete at least twelve
weeks of treatment.161 These findings were not affected by demographics
of the patients, duration or amount of drug use, or presence of
depression.162 This suggests that individuals with impaired cognitive
performance may need modified treatment interventions that will improve
the chance of treatment compliance and completion.163 Studies such as
these demonstrate the utility that neuropsychological testing may play in
improving decisions, such as who is eligible for certain treatment programs.
This use of neuropsychological assessments could help maximize the
chances that individuals provided with the opportunity will possess the
capacity to successfully complete treatment. Such informed decision
making is especially important when there are limited resources that need to
be allocated responsibly.
D. Neuroprediction
Neuroprediction is not without its limits. Yet, similar to actuarial
models, the criticisms of the potential utility of neuroprediction in forensic
settings do not seriously seem to take into account the standards that will
govern its use in a legal setting. Supreme Court precedent has repeatedly
confirmed that it does not treat predictions of human behavior the same way
159. See e.g., Josef M. Ling et al., Biomarkers of Increased Diffusion Anisotropy in SemiAcute Mild Traumatic Brain Injury: A Longitudinal Perspective, 135 BRAIN 1281, 1284
(2012).
160. See generally Efrat Aharonovich et al., Cognitive Impairment, Retention and
Abstinence Among Cocaine Abusers in Cognitive-Behavioral Treatment, 71 DRUG &
ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 207 (2003).
161. See generally Efrat Aharonovich et al., Cognitive Deficits Predict Low Treatment
Retention in Cocaine Dependent Patients, 81 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 313 (2006).
162. See id.
163. See id.
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as other types of evaluations or expert testimony.164 Any issues with
limitations of a technique most likely will go to the weight of the evidence,
not to whether such evidence should be admitted.165
1. Overall Accuracy
One criticism levied against neuroimaging data as a prediction tool is that
it is not 100 percent accurate. The same criticism can be said of any other
risk assessment instrument or predictive tool. Neuroimaging data should
not be held to a different standard than any other type of evidence. The
legal system must make decisions, and the goal of any type of predictive
tool is to help make better decisions than would or could be made without
such tools. Consequently, failure to deliver perfect accuracy is not a
persuasive criticism against the use of neuroscience data in risk equations,
especially if it adds value to the overall collection of predictive instruments.
2. Group to Individual
Another common critique of neuroimaging-based predictions, similar to
actuarial predictions, is that they are designed to predict membership in a
group rather than predict the outcome associated with a single individual.
Again, this is true of any type of prediction instrument that is based on
group statistics. And the non-group-level research has established that even
though clinical predictions are based only on individual data, they are
inferior in their ability to accurately and reliably predict future behavior.166
Furthermore, the ability to compare individual neuroimaging datasets to
large normative databases (of healthy control subjects) allow for
statistically based statements about one individual’s data being within or
outside of normal limits. This type of comparison is akin to the normative
data comparison that underlies neuropsychological testing and rebuts the
argument that statements cannot be made about any one individual using
neuroimaging data.
A follow-up to the study discussed in Part III.C evaluated its predictive
accuracy by testing discrimination and calibration (a version of out-ofsample testing).167 Overall, the ACC activity was modest to strong in terms
of its ability to discriminate between outcomes and had good calibration
accuracy.168 This means that future studies should be able to replicate the
effects.
In addition, the authors wanted to determine the unique
contribution of the ACC region of interest to the model’s predictive

164. See supra Part II (discussing Supreme Court decisions involving predictions of
future dangerousness).
165. See, e.g., In re Detention of Holtz, 653 N.W.2d 613 (Iowa Ct. App. 2002) (finding
any limitations of the Static-99, RRASOR, MNSOST, MNSOST-R instruments go to
weight, not admissibility).
166. See supra Part I.A.
167. See generally Eyal Aharoni et al., Predictive Accuracy in the Neuroprediction of
Rearrest, 9 SOC. NEUROSCIENCE 332 (2014).
168. See id. at 333.
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accuracy.169 They did this by removing the ACC parameter from the two
models, refitting those two new models, and comparing them to the original
full models.170 In both models, the full model performs far better with the
ACC predictor included than when excluded.171
Critics of neuroscience data, similar to critics of actuarial prediction, also
rarely describe an alternative method to make better risk-related
decisions.172
3. Unique Legal and Ethical Issues for Neuroprediction
A valid concern raised during discussions of neuroprediction is whether
there are any unique legal and ethical issues relating to the use of biological
variables to predict risk.
One potential example is whether neuroscience data may have equal
protection implications. Will neuroscience-based risk profiles indicating a
likelihood of not responding to treatment exclude offenders from certain
programs? While such a practice may seem novel, some states already are
engaging in this type of screening and decision making. While such a
practice may seem novel, some states already are engaging in this type of
screening and decision making by using various tests to determine
eligibility for certain treatment programs. And there is research to suggest
that other types of tests—specifically neuropsychological examinations—
can predict poor treatment responsiveness.173 If brain (and genetic)
variables add predictive utility above and beyond that which can be
achieved with existing measures, the application of these measures in
offender populations may give rise to equal protection and discrimination
arguments. However, those same arguments can be raised based on
exclusion using other measures such as neuropsychological or PCL-R data.
If we are comfortable with predicting a particular outcome at all, we will
likely be comfortable with predicting that outcome even better, regardless
of the variable type used to make the prediction.
A critical aspect to an analysis of the issues raised above needs to tease
apart the legal and ethical issues that arise from prediction generally to the
issues unique to neuroscience specifically.
The unique nature of
neuroscientific data being used as legal evidence in a number of different
prediction contexts is a topic scholars have begun to discuss, and a detailed
analysis of these and related ethical issues are topics worthy of
investigation.174
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See Rice et al., supra note 7, at 590.
173. See, e.g., Aharonovich et al., supra note 160.
174. See, e.g., Georgia Martha Gkotsi & Jacques Gasser, Neuroscience in Forensic
Psychiatry: From Responsibility to Dangerousness: Ethical and Legal Implications of
Using Neuroscience for Dangerousness Assessments, 46 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 58, 58
(2016) (arguing that the use of neuroscientific data in criminal trials will be used mostly as
an indicator of a defendant’s dangerousness, rather than responsibility).
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CONCLUSION
Traditional risk-assessment methods are approximations for underlying
neurobiological processes. If we are interested in behaviors like cognition,
intelligence, maturity, and decision-making ability, then we are interested in
brain structure and function.
Improved technology has made high-quality neuroimaging data
collection more accessible and more easily applied to scientific research, so
it is appropriate to start thinking about how neuroscience variables can be
used to improve existing behavioral prediction methods. This Article
should not be interpreted as suggesting that neuroimaging data needs to be
collected from every individual arrested nor that neuroimaging data will be
able to improve prediction of every decision in the system. However, it is
reasonable to recognize the utility in continuing to collect neuroimaging
data in forensic populations to fully explore how measures of brain
structure and function relate to complex behaviors and to improve tools we
use to both measure behavior and evaluate risk. This is all done in pursuit
of the goal of making better decisions—not perfect decisions, simply the
most informed decisions possible—using attainable information.
Indeed, no risk assessment instrument is perfect, but the legal system
does not require perfection. What is required, thanks to an evolution in case
law and the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, is that evidencebased assessments that are used should be valid, reliable, and (ideally)
appropriately applied to the question at hand.175 The two forensic
neuroprediction studies discussed in this Article provide a strong
demonstration of how neuroscience measures can change the way we think
about variables that we already recognize for their influence on behavior.
We understand that factors such as age and maturity or level of impulsivity
have a great deal to do with our decision making and behavior, and most of
us are comfortable with the utility of such measures influencing
expectations about certain outcomes. What these examples illustrate is that
brain measures can occasionally offer a more precise and sensitive method
of quantifying the variability in constructs that we know exist.
Furthermore, because neuroscience measures variables that we know
directly influence behavior, these are intuitively and objectively more
closely related to the outcomes we often wish to predict.
National recidivism rates reflect a criminal justice system that is
ineffective at remediating criminogenic factors that contribute to the
“revolving door” problem of incarceration. There are, of course, many
factors that contribute to the poor outcomes. The lack of effective,
evidence-based treatments, coupled with personality differences that affect
why and how individuals engage in a criminal behavior (and that therefore
impact the effectiveness of interventions), perpetuates the lack of
rehabilitation and therefore leads to an extremely high likelihood of
returning to prison. If we are motivated to effect change, we need to work
to reduce recidivism by implementing interventions that promote desistance
175. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 702.
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from crime.176 An understanding of brain structure and function in
individuals that have committed violent crimes and that are at high risk for
committing violence in the future can help identify offenders at the highest
and lowest risk for offending. Identifying those possible offenders based on
their level of risk allows for more efficient allocation of resources. Even
among the highest risk individuals, identifying the neural mechanisms at
work can help isolate targets for specific interventions and, thus, afford an
opportunity to remediate the risks through treatment.

176. See Gaudet et al., supra note 10.

